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I Introduction 
While corporate boards, audit committees and remuneration committees have been subject to 
extensive analysis and research, one of the most important elements of corporate governance 
has been largely disregarded: the nomination committee.   
The reason why it has been neglected is that it is perceived as falling between stools.  
In the widely dispersed ownership systems of the UK and US, the nomination committee is an 
organ of the board, and shareholders for the most part rubber-stamp the recommendations of 
the committee. In contrast, in the concentrated ownership systems of Continental Europe and 
the Far East, the dominant shareholders are able to exert so much control that a nomination 
committee is largely irrelevant – the large shareholders appoint at will.  The nomination 
committee is therefore decisive or irrelevant.  Either way it is not very interesting. 
This paper suggests that, on the contrary, the nomination committee (NC) should be a 
primary focus of attention in corporate governance debates.  The reason is that, when used in 
a right way, it plays a fundamental role in the appointment and removal of board members 
and is a key determinant of the composition of boards and corporate performance.  If 
companies make the right initial appointments then much else follows; if they do not then no 
other aspect of corporate governance - monitoring, measurement or incentives – can fully 
rectify the damage.  Thus, the legitimacy of the NC in the eyes of the shareholder community 
and the trust received from minority shareholders is pivotal to the empowerment of the board. 
In particular, the NC is critical to concerns about the ownership of companies and the 
engagement of institutional investors in active oversight and monitoring of management.   It 
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will be suggested that the NC can be instrumental in both promoting the type of large, long-
term shareholdings that are a prerequisite to effective institutional engagement and a means 
by which that engagement is exercised.  Furthermore they provide a basis for resolving 
potential conflicts that arise between different shareholders, most notably between dominant 
and minority shareholders.  
The paper will do this by contrasting the operation of NCs in two countries: Sweden 
and the UK. These two countries are particularly interesting because Nasdaq Stockholm and 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) both pride themselves in being at the forefront of Europe’s 
most liberalized and active market economies, based predominantly on self-regulation as 
against legal statute. Both countries embody what is termed “shareholder primacy”, namely 
legal, regulatory and institutional structures that privilege shareholders over the interests of 
other parties, and both countries have a substantial presence of institutional investors as well 
as national pension funds.  They therefore stand in contrast to several other Continental 
European countries and many other parts of the rest of the world where shareholder interests 
receive less prominence in relation to that of other parties to the firm.  They are in this respect 
similar to other common law countries, such as the US, and the analysis reported here has 
relevance to them too.  
While therefore similar in many respects, the nature of the two countries’ NCs are 
very different. In the UK, the NC is an internal committee of the board on which independent 
members sit and nominate successor members of the board.   In Sweden it is an external 
committee in which shareholders play an important role in the selection process. The internal 
system of the UK delegates the nomination of new members of the board to its non-executive 
members. In Sweden, on the other hand, the nomination process resides with representatives 
of shareholders themselves.    
As will be described below, in general Swedish companies have large controlling 
shareholders who have incentives to exert significant influence over the nomination process, 
As a consequence, by giving them a presence on the NC, its nomination process encourages 
their direct engagement in the appointment process and mitigates the shareholder 
disengagement problems that afflict the UK internal system.  On the other hand, it does this at 
the expense of creating another problem, namely potential divergences of interests between 
different types of shareholders, notably between large, well-informed and small, uninformed, 
shareholders.   
As we will see, differences in the nature of ownership and norms of governance 
explain much of the difference in operation of NCs in the two countries.  Understanding the 
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way in which NCs operate in Sweden and the UK is therefore fundamental to an appreciation 
of the merits and deficiencies of different forms of capitalism as reflected in their ownership 
and governance of firms. Growing societal pressure on institutional investors to undertake 
engaged responsible corporate governance (as proposed by, for example, the Kay Review, 
2012 and the EU Shareholders’ Rights Directive, 2014/17) strengthens expectations about the 
role of NCs in corporate governance (the UK Stewardship Code, 2012; Lipton, World 
Economic Forum, 2016).  This paper asks the questions whether the UK system would benefit 
from having more engagement by institutional investors in the nomination process and an 
external rather than an internal NC and would Sweden be advised to reduce the power of 
dominant shareholders in the nomination process and create a greater level of independence 
of NCs from large shareholders?   
To address these questions, we examine how the institutional corporate governance 
settings of Sweden and the UK work to empower institutional investors through the NC. The 
paper draws on a mixture of academic research, legal documents and official as well as 
semiofficial reports. These sources show how ownership has evolved since the 1980s until 
now and the relevance of company law in defining the role of independent directors.  
The paper draws on novel research showing how Swedish institutional investors have 
begun to take larger stakes in investee companies that are evaluated over longer time horizons 
than was previously the case (Nachemson-Ekwall, 2017). In the process, institutional 
investors engage in the NC on a longer-term basis, collaborating both with controlling 
shareholders and other long-term institutional investors. There are advantages to this in 
addressing agency problems but at the expense of the independence of the nomination process 
from influence by particular shareholders.  We discuss the possibility of achieving superior 
outcomes by combining features of the Swedish and UK nomination process.    
The rest of the article is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe the legal and 
regulatory background to NCs in Sweden and the UK. We then discuss the theoretical 
underpinning of NCs in section 3.  In sections 4 and 5, we contrast the operation of NCs and 
institutional investors in Sweden and the UK. Finally, we draw conclusions and propose 
policy recommendations in section 6.  
 
2. The Swedish and UK governance systems 
 
The UK choice of internal and the Swedish of external NCs is a reflection of their respective 
corporate governance, takeover and stewardship codes, and their companies acts and, stock 
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exchange listing rules. A summary of relevant soft and hard laws, listing requirements and 
regulations, including how they have altered over time, is provided in the Appendix. 
Both countries have company acts that state that the board of directors owe fiduciary 
duties to promote the success of their companies for the benefit of their shareholders.  In both 
systems, shareholders vote on director nominees at the annual general meeting (AGM) and 
can propose their own directors. In both countries, the NC is part of a self-regulatory system, 
based on the principle of comply or explain, set out in their respective corporate governance 
codes - the Swedish and UK corporate governance codes. Both countries observe a high 
degree of compliance with their governance codes (Lekvall, 2013; Davies, 2015).   
However, the countries differ in regard to shareholder influence on board composition 
and enrolment, the composition of the NCs, how votes are exercised by the shareholders at 
the AGM, and their attitudes towards shareholder collaboration. The countries also differ in 
their approach to reflecting the interests of minority shareholders in the nomination process. 
Figure 1 illustrates the differences between the two countries’ approaches to the composition 
of NCs. 
 
Figure 1: Two different models of the NC 
 
 
 
Note: The grey circles represent members of the NC, and the arrow shows who proposes nominations 
to the AGM. 
 
The Swedish NC 
Swedish and Nordic corporate governance are based on a two-tier board with separation 
between the organs of the corporation: (i) the shareholders at the AGM: (ii) the board of 
directors, and (iii) the chief executive officer (CEO) and management. The Swedish 
UK	Inside	NC	Model SWEDEN	External	NC	Model
General	assembly
Board
General	assembly
Large	owner ChairInstitutional	Investors
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Companies Act, Aktiebolagslagen, states that the board should treat all shareholders alike2  
and a general meeting should not take decisions that are intended to give an undue preference 
to a particular shareholder or other person to the detriment of the company or other 
shareholders.  
The Companies Act grants a single shareholder or group of shareholders controlling 
50 per cent of the votes at the AGM the right to nominate all the directors of the board. The 
influence of large shareholders can be intensified through multiple voting shares (Series A 
shares assigned 10 votes and B shares assigned 1 vote), and over half of listed companies in 
Sweden have multiple voting stocks (Lekvall, 2014), despite there being a trend to initial 
public offerings (IPOs) with just one class of shares.  Only one executive can be elected to the 
board, usually the CEO and approximately half of listed company boards do not include the 
CEO (Lekvall, 2008). 
The Swedish Corporate Governance Code reflects the dual responsibilities of directors 
in the Companies Act. The Code distinguishes between directors being independent of the 
company and large shareholders (defined as owning more than 10 per cent of capital and 
votes) and recommends that at least two directors be independent of both the company and 
large shareholders. No more than 50 per cent of the directors are permitted to have had a 
relationship with the company (e.g. as a recent employee, customer or financial institution). In 
addition, Swedish co-determination allows two directors to be nominated by the workers’ 
unions, usually one from each of blue and white-collar unions.  The NC is appointed by 
shareholders at an general meeting or during the course of the year (Carlsson 2007; Lekvall, 
2008). 
To avoid the NC being entirely dominated by a controlling shareholder, the Code 
requires that at least one member of the committee be independent of the largest shareholder. 
A typical NC will comprise one or two representatives of the controlling shareholder, the 
chair (who is often associated with the controlling shareholder) and two or three institutional 
investors. These are in general Swedish since foreign institutions usually decline offers to 
participate in the NC (Ehne, 2014). A representative of small investors is sometimes invited to 
																																																						
2 The Principle of Equality in the Swedish Company Act (Ch. 4. 1 §) is that the shares of a company 
shall have equal rights. This is supported by two General Clauses: Ch. 7:47 § directed at limiting what 
constitutes an unfair advantage to a specific shareholder or group of shareholders; and Ch. 8:41 §, 1 
addresses the responsibilities of the board of directors and other company signatories. 
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join the NC but this is unusual. It is common for the NC to comprise members representing 15 
to 20 per cent of shares outstanding, which often is enough to control a majority of the votes 
at the AGM, particularly if the shares have multiple voting rights attached to them.  
 
The UK NC 
NCs became commonplace after the British Cadbury report on corporate governance was 
published in 1992.3  UK corporate governance is based on a one-tier board structure. The UK 
Companies Act allows boards to be made up of a mixture of inside (the CEO and other 
executives) and outside non-executive directors (NEDs). At least half the board, excluding the 
chairman, should comprise NEDs who are regarded by the board as independent in having no 
relation with the company or its related parties and not having served on the board for a 
period exceeding nine years. Exceptions are made for smaller companies, where there should 
be at least two independent NEDs.4 Nominations to the board are made by a NC, which is a 
sub-committee of the main board.   The NC is required to comprise a majority of independent 
NEDs with the chairman of the board or an independent NED acting as its chair.  
The NC is an important component of corporate governance in both the UK and 
Sweden and we turn now to its theoretical underpinnings to understand how it addresses two 
sets of issues: (a) conflicts between minority shareholders and management in the UK and 
between large and small shareholders in Sweden and (b) long-term relationships between 
shareholders and management.  
 
3. Theoretical underpinning of the NC  
The traditional view of the governance of the firm is based on the agency problems that exist 
between shareholders and management.  Adam Smith (1776) discussed the board’s role in 
mitigating information asymmetries between shareholders and management.  Ronald Coase 
(1937) identified the value of empowering the corporate form with a central decision-making 
body, substituting entrepreneurial fiat for the price mechanism of the market.  
Success is expected to lead to a board that both contributes to corporate value creation and 
lower capital costs. Since the beginning of the 1980s the conventional view has been that 
																																																						
3 The UK Corporate Governance Code (the Code) has its origins in the Cadbury Committee in 1992 
and paragraph 2.5 defines corporate governance as “the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled. Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies.”  
4 “Smaller companies” are those that are outside the FTSE 350 during the year immediately prior to 
the reporting year. 
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corporate value creation is evaluated in terms of shareholder wealth, and the board exists to 
monitor, advise and contribute to strategy formation to enhance shareholder value. For 
minority shareholders, it is both cheaper and rational to transfer decision-making to a smaller 
and informed body with authority (Banbridge, 2015)5 - hence the “duty of loyalty” in 
company law.  
The “agency-problem” is then defined as aligning the interests of board and managers 
with those of their external shareholders, to avoid unprofitable growth or undue complacency 
(Berle and Means, 1932/1968; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  However, the agency-problem 
can also be related to conflicting interests between a large block holder, with active 
participation on the board, and minority shareholders with both less influence and information 
giving rise to the principal-principal conflict (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1981/1991; Burkart 
and Panunzi, 2008).  Minority shareholders need specific protection to ensure that the board is 
accountable to all shareholders, i.e. that there are limits to the ability of large shareholders to 
divert wealth to themselves.  
The shareholder primary model has been questioned in many contexts (i.e. Stout, 
2012; Mayer, 2015).   According to these critiques, corporate governance is about “ensuring 
that the corporation abides by its stated purpose, values and principles”.6 Consequently the 
board’s role should focus on creating value in the interest of the corporation itself, its 
employees, stakeholders, including shareholders and society. This focus of the board’s 
function moves away from the agency view to team production theory (Blair and Stout, 1999; 
Huse, 2007).  
Research shows that long-term committed owners have great influence on corporate 
governance. Almost all Nordic companies have a strong owner who is supported in law 
(Sjöstrand et al. 2016; Lekvall, 2013). Studying Danish foundations, Hansmann and Thomsen 
(2012) find a correlation between value creation and support of long-term committed 
industrial foundations. However, strong ownership is by no means always successful and it is 
not clear how much of the success of the Nordic corporate model is attributable to the high 
trust nature of Nordic societies, i.e. small country effects (Sinani et al. 2008). In the case of 
Sweden, it might just be that respect for large owners, passive support from minority 
institutional investors and what is perceived to be a healthy relationship with both the state 
																																																						
5 This reasoning is developed by Bainbridge in Research Handbook on Shareholder Power (2015)  
Bainbridge adheres to the separation thesis as it strengthens the boards’ accountability, giving it a 
strong efficiency justification.  
6 The shareholder empowerment proposition, Hill and Randall (2015) p. 4. 
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and labor unions have allowed Sweden to develop profitable, well-run companies (Henrekson 
and Bergh, 2013).  
 Most jurisdictions formulate the director’s fiduciary duty as being accountable to the 
company and/or shareholders as a whole. This puts the long-term owner-perspective centre 
stage rather than the interests of either current short-term shareholders or management.  
However, the role of the NC differs appreciably between Nordic countries and the UK and US.  
The Nordic model embraces shareholder nominated directors on the board, including 
representatives of large shareholders. All Nordic jurisdictions allow owners controlling 50 per 
cent of the votes at the AGM to enroll all shareholder-nominated board members. The 
Swedish external NC offers all owners a forum to discuss governance issues and to enter a 
dialogue with the company. Collaboration and concerted activities among shareholders, 
including institutional investors, are encouraged. A number of studies of the Swedish capital 
market suggest that conflicts between large and small shareholders have overall been kept at a 
low level, trust between majority and minority shareholders in general being high (Gilson, 
2006; Sinani et al. 2008; Lekvall, 2014). 
The other Nordic countries have adopted different versions of the external NC model. 
The Norwegian NC is specified in the corporate charter, and different stakeholders are elected 
to the NC at the AGM – shareholders, employee-representatives and board members. Finish 
companies can choose between an internal or external NC model without any co-
determination. The NC in Denmark is internal and has a mixture of executives and 
shareholder supported directors and there is Danish codetermination. Thus, the Swedish NC 
version with all shareholder representatives, represent an extreme version of the Nordic 
corporate governance model.  
In contrast, the UK and US have stock markets dominated by dispersed ownership and 
companies acts that empower management-led boards. In the US, the board comprises a 
mixture of internal and external directors empowered to interpret their fiduciary duty to 
protect long-term interest of the company. Board enrolment is an internal matter, with the NC 
part of the board and in the control of the chair, the vice chair and the CEO. In the post-
financial crisis era, a number of companies have been pressed by their shareholders to change 
their by-laws to facilitate enrolment of shareholder nominated directors.7  
																																																						
7 In 2010 the Obama administration plan to force companies to include directors’ nominees from 
certain large shareholders in the corporation’s proxy under specific conditions (US 2010, Rule 14a-11) 
was voted down. Shareholders have since acted to change byelaws instead.  For a description see: 
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The UK Companies Act does empower the General assembly to suggest directors (just 
as in Sweden) but shareholders seldom take action. British governance views large 
shareholders as stakeholders with specific interests rather than those of shareholders as a 
whole. Thus the Companies Act therefore supports the presence of non-executives on the 
board but a board composed of only independent NEDs would turn into a pure monitor 
(Davies, 2015). To balance the different roles of directors, the Companies Act requires a 
mixture of internal and external (independent) directors.  The UK corporate governance code 
states that a NC should be composed of a majority of independent directors and recommends 
that only one representative for a large owner be elected.8   
 Legal scholars highlight that corporate governance codes, including the original 
British Cadbury rules, are unclear about the definition of “independent directors”. Hansen 
(2013) draws on the Nordic governance experience to argue that independent directors all too 
often fail to monitor and discipline management. Independent directors that are independent 
of both the company and owners do not solve the governance problem; instead Hansen claims 
that governance should recognize the importance of active owners.9 An extensive study of 
board work in 36 large Nordic companies (Sjöstrand et al. 2016) shows that dominant 
shareholders in general do not appreciate the work of the NC and handle the enrolment of the 
most significant directors outside of the NC.   
There is no evidence of significant performance effects from the presence of 
independent directors on company boards (Bhagat and Black, 1999, 2002; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003; Adams et al. 2010). Examining the rise of independent directors as a legal 
transplant from jurisdictions with dispersed ownership to other systems in which controlled 
corporations are dominant, Ferrarini and Filippelli (2015) show that countries use different 
definitions of, and assign different powers to independent directors of dispersed ownership 
and controlled companies. Independent directors of controlled companies have a narrower and 
weaker role than their counterparts in companies with dispersed ownership. Independence 
requirements in the block-holder context therefore need to be sufficiently broad to encapsulate 
																																																																																																																																																																									
IGOPP, institute of governance. Who should pick board members?  Proxy Access by Shareholders to 
the Director Nomination Process. Policy paper no. 8 2015. Canada. www.igopp.org  
8 Provision B.2.1 of the UK Code.  
9 See, inter alia, the European Commission, Green Paper on Corporate governance in financial 
institutions and remuneration policies, COM (2010) 284, Brussels, 2 Jun. 2010, 8, where a reason for 
the failure of shareholders in the recent crisis is explained by ‘the lack of effective rights allowing 
shareholders to exercise control’, and in the title of its Action Plan, n. 3 supra, specific reference is 
made to engaging shareholders.  
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the relationship between independent directors and controlling shareholders. Andersson 
(2013) and Kershaw (2015) question the idea of independent directors as value creation 
mechanisms, citing a lack of industrial knowledge, their annual re-election, and dependence 
on the support of the executive members of the board as limitations on their effectiveness.  
 
4. Contrasting NCs in Sweden and the UK 
Inspired by the Cadbury Code in 1992, the Swedish external NC was developed by the 
Swedish Shareholders’ Association, with the support of a group of leading domestic 
institutional investors. It was put into practice for the first time in 1993, after the failed merger 
between Swedish vehicle conglomerate Volvo and French Renault, which left Volvo without 
a board of directors, but it took until 2005 before the NC became standard Swedish procedure 
because incumbent owners were in general negative about adopting a corporate governance 
code, 
The Swedish NC is partly an attempt (dating back to the early 1900s) to embed 
minority shareholders in the governance of publicly traded companies. From 1910 onwards, 
different versions of the Companies Act limited voting rights of a controlling shareholder 
electing directors to 20 per cent of the votes present at the AGM, if not otherwise stated in the 
corporate statutes. This remained in place until 2005.10 
The external NC model was also inspired by Swedish popular movements11   The 
original proposal from the Shareholders Association was to have shareholders setting up NCs 
at AGMs, with public exposure to shareholders providing accountability to large and small 
shareholders. To ensure the NCs independence from large owners at least one member was 
required to be independent of any large shareholder or shareholders working in collaboration. 
(Chapter 2 §3). Between 2005 and 2010 the notion of independent directors was part of the 
																																																						
10	Swedish Companies Act as of 1944 states that to enhance trust between different groups of 
shareholders – i.e. large dominating shareholders and minority shareholders –no single shareholder 
should be able to vote for more than 20 per cent of the votes present at the AGM, though higher or 
lower levels could be stipulated in the articles of association (p. 348–9, 114–127 §§). This was 
strengthened in the Companies Act of 1975, with the rule that no shareholder may vote for more than 
one-fifth of the shares represented at the meeting, unless stated otherwise (SOU 1995:44 p. 20). 
However, by the millennium most corporate statutes stated that all shares would have full voting rights 
at the AG, limits only being possible in relation to voting rights of the series. This was removed in the 
revision 2005. See, also, Nachemson-Ekwall (2018).	
11 In this democratic structure, with each member assigned one vote, the standard procedure is to carry 
out director enrolment through the help of external nomination committees, made up of members 
nominated by different groups at the AGM. For research related to the Swedish popular movement, 
see Filip Wijkström, Stockholm Centre on Civil Society Studies at SSE Institute of Research (SIR). 
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Nasdaq Stockholm’s listing requirements but it was removed in 2010. 
The Cadbury Committee in the UK stated in 1992 that a majority of directors should 
be independent of the company where independence was defined as being free from any 
business or other relations that might materially interfere with their exercise of independent 
judgment. NEDs were to be selected through a formal process with the support of a 
nomination committee and both this process and their appointment was to be a matter for the 
board as a whole, thereby limiting risk of stakeholder influence (1992: 4.10–4.17). Re-
election was to be at least every third year.  In the preparatory work of the Cadbury code 
consideration was given to the idea that shareholders should be more closely involved in the 
appointment of directors and auditors through the formation of “shareholders’ committees”. 
However, this was ruled out: “…as we have not seen evidence explaining how it would be 
possible to form shareholder committees in such a way that they would be both truly 
representative of all the company’s shareholders and able to keep in regular touch with their 
changing constituencies. Unless these tests of legitimacy are met, the Committee is unable to 
see how shareholder committees can become the accepted link between a board and its 
shareholders.” (Section Accountability to the Shareholders. 6.3). 
 
5. The British and Swedish institutional investors in the NC  
British and Swedish domestic institutional investors’ play an important role in legitimizing 
the NC as a corporate governance device. Traditionally, there has been a home-bias in 
domestic institutional investments with 30 to 50 percent of equity portfolios being allocated to 
domestic stocks (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Dahlquist et al, 
2003). Despite the theoretical merits of global diversification, quantitative limits in many 
countries (Yermo, 2008; Nachemson-Ekwall, 2016) and a preference for exit over voice 
despite an increasing concentration of stakes (Jackson, 2008), investing in the home market 
continues in both the UK and Sweden and is supported by claimed benefits such as better 
information, lower asset management costs, and lower transaction costs (Coval and 
Moskowitz, 1999; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Dahlquist et al. 2003). 
 
The role of Swedish institutional investors 
Swedish institutional investor influence on the stock market has changed recently (Table 1). 
In 1990, the year before Sweden opened up for foreign direct investments on the stock 
exchange, Swedish institutional investors such as the four large Swedish National Pension 
Funds (SNPFs), life insurance companies, and mutual funds controlled 28 percent of the 
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Swedish Stock Exchange (SSE), and foreign investors controlled close to 8 percent. By 2000 
foreigners controlled almost 40 per cent, while almost all other categories had reduced their 
holdings. Swedish institutional investors had reduced their holding to 22 per cent, a level that 
has been more or less maintained since then. 
Due to regulations, the influence of Swedish institutions has been limited. SNPF and 
mutual fund ownership in a company is capped at 10 percent of shares or votes (Law on 
investment funds 2004:46). In addition, each SNPF may only own 2 percent of the SSE. In 
practice, the SNPFs have pursued diversified investment strategies that have fallen short of 
these limits. 
 
Table 1: Ownership on the SSE 
 
 
Source: Adaption from Statistics Sweden (March 2016), only capital, not voting power. 
CEIFs (Closed-end investment funds; Investor, Industrivärden etc.) 
SNPFs (Swedish National Pension Funds, AP1-AP4) 
 
Holdings of private and corporate occupational pension funds are limited by capital 
requirements (i.e. solvency rules such as those stipulated through the IORP, 2003/2016). 
Consequently, Swedish incumbent block-owners and main shareholders have, despite their 
decreased capital holdings have remained in the driver seat of Swedish corporate governance. 
Until the end of the financial boom in 2008, Swedish institutional investors, when they 
participated in nomination committees, acted passively, either supporting larger shareholders 
(Hellman, 2005) or selling during takeovers (Kallifatides et al 2010; Nachemson-Ekwall, 
2012). Long-term activism by institutional investors was limited to a few high-profile cases 
% 
Year 
Corps. 
and Orgs. CEIFs 
Mutual 
funds 
Life 
Insur.  SNPF State 
House-
holds 
Non-
profits Foreign  
Billion 
SEK 
1986 17 13 6 14 5 2 25 10 8   500 
1990 23 10 8 14,5 6 2 18 8 8    545 
1995 10 7 9 13 4 3 15 8 30 1 200 
2000 9 6 8 10 4 5 13 5 39 4 098 
2005 11 5 12 9 3,5 4 15 5 35 3 054 
2010 11 5 12 9 3 4 13 4 38 3 701 
2015 14 6 12 7,5 2,5 2 11 4 40 6 071 
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where media campaigns were highly effective.12 Nevertheless, domestic institutions clearly 
embrace the model (Lekvall, 2008; Tomorrow’s Company, 2016).  
 
The role of the UK institutional investor 
The general picture of UK as a fully dispersed shareholder regime, with atomized 
shareholders having large costs for coordination, is not correct (Davies, 2015). Until the 
1960s, dispersed shareholders (pensions funds and insurance companies) achieved a sufficient 
level of coordinated action to influence the environment in which their investee companies 
operated.  
British self-regulation, with its roots in the 1960s’ development of the first takeover 
rules, were formed in close collaboration with the institutional investor community, the 
corporations and the City (i.e. investment banks). This differed from Sweden, where the 
Swedish version of self-regulation grew out of the interest of the owners (namely families 
such as the Wallenbergs and Handelsbanken). In Sweden, it took until the 1990s before the 
voice of institutional investors was heard.  
The institutionalization of the British stock market began earlier than in Sweden (and 
other European countries). The destocking-process, with pensions funds moving out of the 
domestic stock market to global investments and bonds, also started earlier in the UK and has 
gone much further. Statistics show the development. Data from the UK Office of National 
Statistics (ONS) shows that (Table 2): 
 
• In 1963, individual investors owned 53 per cent of the listed stocks. By 2010 the ownership 
was down to approximately 10 per cent.  
• Rest of the world ownership has risen from below 10 per cent in the years 1963–1980s, to 
close to 54 per cent in 2014. 
• Insurance companies and pension funds have had the most interesting development, growing 
from 16 percent of the market in 1963 to 52 percent in 1993 and are now down below ten per 
cent. 
• Investment trusts, retail and mutual funds, have been more stable around 12 per cent. 
Consequently, British domestic institutional investors still hold around 20 per cent of the LSE, 
but the group comprises many more organizations than the Swedish equivalent. 
• Rest of the world ownership stood at an estimated 54 percent of the value at the end of 2014. 
This was up from 31 percent in 1998.  
 
At the time of Cadbury 1992, UK based institutional investors controlled 62 per cent of the 
																																																						
12 Among high profile cases are the halted Volvo-Renault deal (1993), the crash of the insurance company 
Skandia (2001), the ABB-scandal (2000) and lately, the criticised cross-holdings between Industrivärden and 
Handelsbanken (2015).   
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LSE (in Sweden 28 per cent for 1990). Thus, at the time of market liberalization UK already 
lacked controlling shareholders instead placing the interest of British institutional investors 
foremost.  
Domestic institutions such as pensions funds, insurance companies and institutional 
investment trusts, control around 20 per cent of the LSE market cap, just about the same size 
as the Swedish. They also invest with a considerable home-bias, 26 per cent of their overall 
asset portfolio being invested in British stocks (the UK market makes up 7 per cent of the 
World).13 However, the UK stands out both compared to Sweden, and other European 
countries, as regards the smaller size of block-holdings by institutional investors (Holderness, 
2009; Edmans and Holderness, 2017).  
 
Table 2: Ownership on UK Stock market (LSE) 
 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics November 2016 
Note: Data in 1998 was collected on a different basis compared with more recent years 
Numbers may not sum due to rounding 
 
Engagement by Swedish institutional investors 
A number of studies show that the Swedish version of an external NC has had substantial 
impact on shareholder engagement in the nomination process, increased confidence in the 
board function and encouraged shareholders to become more involved (Poulsen, Strand and 
Thomsen, 2010). Building on comparative material from institutional investor activities and 
proxy statements at the AGMs in Denmark and Sweden, Hannes and Strand (2013) claim that 
																																																						
13 Statistics from Vanguard Asset Management 2016 30 November, Morningstar. 
Beneficial Owners LSE
Per cent £ Billion
1963 1975 1981 1993 1998 2010 2014 1998 2014
Rest of the world 7 5,6 3,6 16,3 30,7 43,4 53,8 460,9 928,6
Individuals 54 37,5 28,2 17,7 16,7 10,2 11,9 250,8 206,2
Unit and investment trusts 1,3 4,1 3,6 9,1 2,0 10,9 11,8 50,0 186,0
Other financial institutions 11,3 10,1 10,5 0,4 2,7 12,3 7,1 40,4 123,0
Insurance companies 10 15,9 20,5 20 21,6 8,8 5,9 325,5 101,8
Pension funds 6,4 16,8 26,7 31,7 21,7 5,6 3,0 325,8 51,7
Public, Non-financial/-profit 8,7 9,3 6,6 4,2 2,9 6,2 6,1 42,7 105,0
Banks 1,3 0,7 0,3 0,6 0,6 2,5 1,4 8,4 24,3
Total 100 100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 1504 1727
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the Swedish NC model has transferred power from the board to shareholders across almost all 
listed companies at the SSE. Nearly all companies listed on the SSE have domestic 
institutional investors on their NC’s, often two,14 thereby reducing both free-rider and 
collective action problems (Hannes and Strand, 2013).	Also, the “old boys network” has 
clearly been broken (Björkmo, 2008).  
Domestic institutional investors have enhanced the recruitment of female board 
members.  There are more females among the independent directors than among the owner 
dependent directors (AP2, 2016). Since institutions are only involved in the enrolment of 
independent directors, this indicates that engagement of institutional investors on the NC has 
had a strong gender effect (Table 3). Other studies claim that institutional investors in NCs 
have played a particular role in director enrolment in small and medium sized companies, 
where executives and owners often lack access to a network of relevant qualified people 
(Grönberg and Kallifatides, 2012). 
 
Table 3: Enrolment of female directors among owner dependent and independent 
directors. Statistics AGMs 2016. 
 
 
 
 
Source: with courtesy from Lannebo funds, Didner & Gerge, AMF and Swedbank (2016) 
 
An important influence on these development is the larger share stakes in investee companies 
held by Swedish institutional investors post the financial crisis.  This has resulted in more 
engaged investing, leveraging on the external NC. Research by Nachemson-Ekwall (2017) 
includes in-depth interviews with fifty representatives of Swedish institutional investors 
conducted between 2015 and 2016. Looking at the period 2000–2016 seventy per cent of 
them committed more capital to larger stakes than previously and evaluated their investments 
over a longer time horizon (Table 4), with a view to enhancing performance.  
 
																																																						
14 www.holdings.se lists all nomination committees. 
Females, % Total  Independent Owner dependent 
Large  32 44 18 
Mid 29 42 8 
Small 24 32 10 
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Table 4:  The largest Swedish institutional investors and their stakes on the SSE 
 
 
 
Source: Aktieservice, 2007; Holdings.se 2016; In Nachemson-Ekwall (2016)	
*Bought Skandia AB for SEK 22.5 Billion in 2011, and sold off parts of the Swedish portfolio 
**Bought 10 % in Swedbank for SEK 10 Billion in 2008 
 
 
This change in investment style has occurred within the current regulatory framework and 
without an overall increase in portfolio asset exposure to the Swedish stock market. To 
provide further insight into the rationale for this change in domestic institutional investments, 
Nachemson-Ekwall (2017) re-conceptualizes their investment strategy using a three-phase 
framework. In the first phase, broadly the period 1980 to 2000, the collectivization of the 
Swedish capital market took off and began to move abroad. There were institutional 
investments with larger stakes, but engagement remained more or less passive (Hellman, 
2005). In the second phase, broadly consisting of the period just before the turn of the 
millennium and up to the beginning of the post-financial-crisis era, the globalization of capital 
markets was associated with a focusing of the industry on low-cost benchmarking, index 
tracking and smaller stakes in each company. The third phase, began during the final stage of 
2016 Owner 
> 3% !! > 5% !!
Focus? No of stocks 
Billion 
SEK 2007 2016 2007 2016 
  !! !! !! !!     
1 Swedbank Robur 57 97 29 67 + 173 171 
2 Alecta 21 19 15 12 (-) 30 116 
3 AMF pension & funds 8 29 5 13 + 139 116 
4 SHB funds 6 47 4 19 + 269 93 
5 SEB funds 20 28 6 12 + 233 70 
6 Nordea funds 25 48 8 31 + 174 63 
7 SNPF4 17 47 8 30 + 131 51 
8 Skandia life & funds* 32 11 26 5 (-) 141 42 
9 Folksam ins +KPA** 0 1 0 1 (=) 46 42 
10 Didner & Gerge funds 16 17 7 12 + 64 37 
11 Länsförsäkringar funds 21 22 5 16 + 192 37 
12 Lannebo funds 15 43 8 36 + 88 35 
13 SNPF3 3 5 0 3 + 116 31 
14 SNPF1 2 3 1 3 + 28 31 
15 AFA ins  24 5 13 4 - 43 29 
16 SNPF2 4 8 1 6 + 134 27 
17 Carnegie funds 6 14 0 8 + 56 25 
18 SPP funds "! 0 "! 0 = 71 24 
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the financial-bubble years, but the results – in the form of an increased focus on larger stakes 
in the active portfolio mandate on the Swedish stock market – only showed up a few years 
into the post-financial crisis era. This change in investment style hinges on a reconsideration 
of portfolio-allocation strategies with for example more index-tracking (passive) mandates co-
existing with a domestic focused strategy enabling a shareholder friendly engagement. In the 
process, Swedish institutional investors claim that they engage longer-term with the NC, 
collaborating both with controlling shareholders and other long-term institutions.  
 
A head of stock equity at a life insurance company explains:  
“We believe in home bias. Seventy percent of all our assets are invested in Sweden. 
We have 10% in Swedish stocks. We have been around for a long time; we know our 
companies, engage in corporate governance and can talk to the directors. It pays off, 
long-term. Outside Sweden, my network is weaker. In Asia, I am a nobody.”  
 
Also, all institutional investors highlight the close interaction between domestic institutional 
investors in the Swedish corporate governance model. Large shareholders are expected to be 
engaged and to coordinate activities. Everyone knows each other. A chair can easily get in 
touch with the five largest domestic investors, whereas the foreign institutional investors are 
either disengaged or difficult to reach. The head of sustainability and governance of a bank-
controlled mutual fund describes its role: 
 
“We have been practising governance for 20 years now. It is expected of us that we 
are engaged and responsible. When we make large investments, we engage (for the) 
long term. Sweden is in the forefront in this process.” 
 
There are also studies critiquing the work of the Swedish external NC. A survey made by 
proxy-consultant Nordic Investor Services (2010) of 27 chairs of companies and 33 chairs of 
nomination committees from 25 large and 25 smaller companies in April-June 2010 reveal 
that there is a problem relating to possible insider information and that institutional investor-
representatives, like corporate governance specialists, often lacked company specific 
competencies. This has largely been left un-addressed. A list of the institutional investors on 
the NC complied from the AGM season 2016 reveal an overwhelming number of investment 
professionals, and a number of them participate on 10 NC (Table 5).  
 
		
18	
Table 5: Institutional investors with the largest number of members on the NC 
 
 
Source: Holdings.se 2016. 10 individuals on 69 NC mean an average of 7 each. 
 
Studies also highlight the concentration of power in the hands of the NC. When the NC only 
represents 10–15 per cent of the total shareholdings it really lacks legitimacy in the eyes of 
other minority shareholders (Björkmo, 2008). The Swedish version of external NC has also 
difficulty dealing with controlling shareholders that choose not to collaborate with minority 
shareholders, which could also be institutional investors (Nachemson-Ekwall, 2012/ 2017). In 
addition, since 2010 there is no regulation in the Nasdaq Stockholm listing requiring large 
owner independent directors, and no transparent checking on the quality of the two 
independent directors that are enrolled in companies where a large owner controls a majority 
of the votes at the AGM (Nachemson-Ekwall, 2012). Discussing the activities taken by hedge 
fund activist Cevian in relation to Old Mutual’s hostile takeover of Skandia 2006, Kallifatides 
et al (2010) document how Sweden’s external NC appears only to have limited ability to 
handle risks of short-termism or stakeholder-interests (Nachemson-Ekwall, 2012; Andersson, 
2013).  
In the revised Code 2015 two changes were introduced related to the NC. Rule 2 now 
states that any person on the NC shall upon acceptance consider possible conflicts of interest. 
Apr-16 Nomination committees 
Institutional Investor AUM 
No of 
individuals 
 No of     
 companies 
Swedbank Robur 172 10 69 
Vanguard 140 0 0 
Black Rock 132 0 0 
Alecta 120 7 18 
AMF  115 7 24 
SHB funds +Exact 95 7 24 
SEB funds and life 87 5 29 
Capital Group 63 0 0 
Nordea funds 63 13 60 
AP4 51 9 52 
Fidelity 44 0 0 
Skandia Life & funds 42 5 5 
Folksam 42 1 1 
Didner &Gerge 38 4 14 
LF funds 37 4 16 
Lannebo funds 35 12 30 
Invesco 31 0 0 
AP2 28 3 9 
Catella funds 15 3 12 
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It also demands that the NC considers diversity of directors and works to promote gender 
equality (Ch. 2 §1).15 There appears to be a dominance of independent directors educated at a 
few business schools. Among the independent female board members almost all have a 
degree from the Stockholm School of Economics. They are all dependent on good 
relationships with the institutional investors. Integrity is not all that matters when there is a 
risk of “cold shouldering” creating less opportunities for jobs in the future (Andersson (2013)). 
Studying Norwegian female board members, Huse et al (2014) points to the problem with a 
growing group of female independent directors that have become professionals, aiming to 
gain board positions rather than display loyalty to a company. Consequently, the quality of 
independent (female) directors is not assured in the shareholder-led NC.  
Foreign institutional investors, such as Vanguard, Blackrock and Capital group abstain 
from participation on the NC, thus limiting engagement from the international community to a 
few activist hedge funds. The general reason is that they do not understand the model; there is 
a language barrier and they are unwilling to devote the necessary time (Ehne, 2014). The 
shareholder led NC model, which enrols members on the basis of institutional size, works 
against private investor participation. This is especially troubling in SMEs that often lack 
enough institutional capital.  
 
Engagement by British institutional investors 
There are few studies on the legitimacy and efficacy of the UK NC. In the FRC report on 
Corporate Governance and Stewardship published January 2017 it was stated that 90 per cent 
of FTSE 350 companies report compliance with all, or all but one or two, of its 54 provisions. 
A lack of independent directors remained the highest non-compliant provision. There was 
also a need for nomination committees to have a more active role in the alignment of board 
composition with company strategy, and to ensure that the board has the necessary skills to 
promote long-term success of the company (p. 7).  
Tomorrow’s Corporate Governance (2010) highlights the high cost of stewardship for 
individual large British institutional investors compared to the Swedish equivalent. Having 
conducted a survey, FRC (2011) highlight problems with managing conflicts of interest and 
acting through proxy voting agencies. 
There is little empirical evidence on institutional investor contacts with the NC, 
probably reflecting the low level of involvement and UK stewardship failing to deliver 
																																																						
15 Sweden does not have a gender-quota, that exists in Norway, Spain, France and Germany. 
		
20	
institutional investor engagement (Hill, 2016). Explanations vary. Addressing a lack of 
stakeholder voice related to directors’ remuneration BEIS (2016) blames traditional free 
riding in relation to engagement costs. Armour and Cheffins (2012) emphasize capital market 
regulation that increases costs of engagement as it drives the long-only funds in the direction 
of asset diversification and less equity (i.e. the IORP and market-to-market accounting). Tilba 
and McNulty (2013) find that only 2 out of 35 British pensions schemes exhibited “engaged 
ownership behavior”, such as company research, voting and face-to-face meeting with senior 
management and directors. The mandate to promote corporate value creation becomes 
progressively more unclear as it works through intermediaries along the so-called asset-value 
chain. Institutional investor engagement seems to be more related to specific cases, i.e. 
activism and executive remuneration (Edmans, 2014; Becht et al 2009; 2016; The Big 
Innovation Centre, 2016/17).16  
There are concerns that signatories to the Stewardship Code do not abide by it (Wong, 
2015); there is a general difficulty in evaluating the quality of possible collective engagement 
by institutions and mandates given to them (FRC, 2011); and there are concerns that the UK 
Stewardship Code ultimately targets a relatively small number of shareholders, as the 
proportion of UK-listed equity owned by domestic institutional investors has progressively 
dropped (Cheffins 2010; Davies, 2015). 
 
6. Conclusions 
The board of director nomination-process is a particularly important but largely ignored 
aspect of corporate governance.  It has been ignored in relation to the attention that has been 
paid to other corporate governance committees, such as the remuneration and audit 
committees.  Both of these appear to have greater relevance to the financial performance of 
firms and the correction of managerial failure. EU legislation has addressed both areas.  
 In actual fact, the nomination process is particularly important because it is a primary 
determinant of the composition of corporate boards and therefore the functioning and 
performance of the firm.  As custodians of the corporate purpose and firm values, the board 
plays a critical role in establishing the objectives of the firm and overseeing their 
implementation through the formulation of strategy, measurement of performance and setting 
of standards and incentives.  The identification of the right members of the board is therefore 
																																																						
16 For a description on UK institutional investor activism; Big Innovation Centre, The Purposeful 
Company, Interim report, May 2016 and final report February 2017.  
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a primary influence on the operation of the firm. 
 The comparison of the nomination process in Sweden and the UK has been 
particularly insightful because of the similarities between the two countries.  Both countries 
place considerable significance on self-regulation and liberalized markets, and on shareholder 
rights and privileges. Both countries house a large group of domestic institutional investors 
such as retail funds as well as national and private pensions funds.  
However, the differences are as pronounced as the similarities in particular in terms of 
the presence of block-holders or main shareholders, significant concentrations of shares in 
Sweden but not in the UK, as well as different approaches in the companies act to 
blockholders influence on the directors. This has given rise to pronounced variations in the 
way in which the nomination committees have been structured and operate in the two 
countries.  In Sweden, an external nomination committee provides a forum in which the 
contrasting views of dominant shareholders about the composition of boards can be resolved.  
Rightly used, it is an effective way of encouraging shareholder engagement in the nomination 
process.   
 In the UK, the highly dispersed nature of share ownership makes the involvement of 
shareholders in the nomination process more difficult.  There is a serious free rider problem 
that has given rise to the phenomenon of the “ownerless corporation” in which no investor 
plays an active governance role (Mayer, 2013).  As a result, instead of engaging shareholders 
in the nomination process, appointments are an internal process in which (independent) 
members of the board nominate board members themselves for ratification at shareholder 
meetings.   
 The advantage of the UK procedure is that it keeps the nomination process 
independent of any particular shareholding group and promotes the fair treatment of all 
shareholders.  In the Swedish external nomination process, while there is a requirement on 
members of the committee to represent the interests of all shareholders, there is an inevitable 
and unavoidable privileging of those present on the nomination committee.  Indeed, some 
investors regard the fact that appointees inevitably feel a sense of gratitude to those who have 
appointed them as a potential advantage of building a relation between investors and boards.   
 The drawback of the UK system is the lack of effective oversight of the nomination 
process by other parties than the board itself.  The members of the board owe a fiduciary duty 
of care and loyalty to all shareholders and no doubt perform their functions to the best of their 
abilities but it is essentially an internal self-election process, albeit subject to ratification by 
shareholders. 
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 The more serious consequence is that the British system does not create the feeling of 
loyalty and mutual respect between directors and dominant shareholders of the Swedish 
system.  There are no dominant shareholders with whom to establish relations in the UK 
process and therefore relations are transactional in nature.  That makes reliance on indirect 
mechanisms of corporate control through activism and takeovers particularly commonplace in 
the UK context.  It exacerbates the impression in the UK of short-term attitudes and 
engagement by shareholders.   
 An external nomination committee is therefore part of the development of the longer-
term relations between domestic institutional investors and firms that appear to be emerging 
in Sweden and have been noticeably absent from the UK.  In addition to being a consequence 
of the presence of share-blocks, Swedish external nomination committees contribute to the 
formation of blocks by providing an inducement to shareholders to acquire sufficiently large 
and long-term shareholdings to gain representation on the committees. It is in essence a 
reward for sacrificing some of the benefits of portfolio diversification, namely insurance for 
bad governance and reduced costs of illiquidity. Thus, the external NC works to empower 
long-term institutional investors.  
Shareholder-empowerment in Sweden relies on collaboration and trust, and makes it 
easy for a block-holder or main shareholder to initiate a sale, share buy-back or break-up, 
even if their share stake is small. At the same time, a committed owner can contribute to the 
survival and success of a company, and newly listed companies in Sweden have in the last 
years actively sought main investors at the time of their IPOs to purchase significant blocks of 
their shares.  
 While the Swedish and UK systems may be regarded as contrasting in terms of their 
structure and operation, there is no reason why elements of them should not be combined. 
Pure external and internal nomination committee can be viewed as lying at two ends of a 
spectrum in which the nomination process can vary between an external shareholder and 
internal board determined process.  For example, some of the board positions could be 
nominated by external and other by internal committees.  Alternatively, all appointments 
could be by internal committee as in the UK but with some external shareholder 
representation and, within both models, collaboration between external and internal parties 
can be encouraged to ensure the nomination of a cohesive team of directors.  
 This development has significant implications for the exercise of corporate 
governance because it provides for both long-term engaged shareholder participation and 
independent self-appointments by the board.  It allows, for example, for lead shareholders to 
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take it in turn to initiate board positions on behalf of other shareholders and benefit 
themselves from the lead role played by their co-investors in other companies.  In other words, 
a flexible application of internal and external nomination committees may help to address 
many of the issues associated with free-riding and conflicts of interests in corporate 
governance while promoting sustainable wealth creation in the interest of the company and its 
shareholders as a whole.  
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Appendix A
 
UK 
DEVELOPMENT OF HARD LAW COMMENT
UK COMPANIES ACT The duty of loyalty is "to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole" and Companies Act 2006, § 172
have regards to employees, environment, customers and suppliers, society, reputation and fiarness among differnet stakeholders
Companies Act 2006 The board is to be made up of a mixture of inside and outside (non-executive) directors
A shareholder may submit a proposal for the nomination of a director candidate if he holds 5 % of the shares of the company. Before 2009 10 % was required for the EGM
Incumbant management and board do not have to treat these candidacies on equal footing with those proposed by the NC
Exceptions are made for smaller companies; these should have at least two independent non-executive directors Below the FTSE 350 
Co-determination UK lacks employee representatives on the board; government plans for introdcuing an advisory board Conservative Party manifest, May 2017
TAKEOVER RULES Directors can consider other issues besides price when making a recommendation to the shareholders Takeover Code 2011 (after Krafts bid on Cadbury)
DEVELOPMENT OF  SOFT LAW
GOVERNANCE CODE The board must constitute not more than 50% executives and at least 50% independent NEDs. UK CGC 2016: B.2.1
A large shareholder, (with more than 10 % of votes), may only nominate one director
Separation between the CEO and chair
Directors of the 350 largest listed companies shall stand for annual re-election Change 2010
Nomination Committe to include three independent NEDs 
Cadbury Code 1992 Introduced the notion of non-executive independent directors, suggested by a NC representing the board as whole Cadbury 1992: 4.10–4.17
Myners Report 2001 Encourage investor engagement in corproate governance Was not very effective
Higgs Report 2003 Cleared the independence of a large shareholder, set at 10 %, introduced a 10 year limit for independence
The NC to be made up of a majority of independent directors, clearer role for senior independent director
Walker Review 2009 Yearly re-election of all directors
Relaxation of definition of independence, to enable enrollment of industry-competence
ROLE OF NON EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS NEDs COMMENT
NEDs Defined as independent of the company and an owner that might influence behaviour The Code and Companies Act
A senior independent NED is assigned the role to have contact with large shareholders UK CGC 2012: A.4.1
Controlling Shareholders An owner >30 % of votes must sign a "relationship agreement" codifying the relationship to minority shareholders
Listing Rules. The Financial Conduct Authority 2014 
FCA PS 14/8. 
ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
Stewardship Code Subject to Stewardship Code since 2010
Encourage formation of "investor forum", supported by asset owners in 2013 IMA 2013b
Companies are obliged to state how they interact with their shareholders Code Provision 2014; E.2.2
Targeting institutonal investors on the LSE to enhance engagement and monitoring long-term FRC 2010
Shareholder collaboration Owners "Acting in Concert", i e in control over 30 % of stocks must present a mandatory bid  The UK Takeover Code
Owners may "collaborate" on director nomination, given that they not aiming for control seeking activities UK CGC 2012 principle 5
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SWEDEN
DEVELOPMENT OF HARD LAW COMMENT
COMPANIES ACT Separation between the CEO and chairman. Directors are voted in by simple majority at AGM. Only one executive on the board
1944/75/95 A shareholder/shareholders controlling 50 per cent of the votes at the AGM can vote in all nominated directors Companies act. 
Voting rights Companies can have multiple voting stocks , no more than 1:10 Since 1995, before 1:1000
Voting limits Until the millenium there existed different types of caps on voting i.e. 20 %, 5 %, number of shares (20) Removed over a numbe rof years, the last 2001
Companies Act 1944 To enhance trust between different groups of shareholders – i.e. large dominating shareholders and minority shareholders – it 
was possible to include in the company’s charter that no single shareholder should be able to vote for more than 20 per cent of 
the votes present at the AGM.
Companies act 1944 §114–127, p. 348–349. 
Companies Act 1975 The chief rule of the stating that no shareholder may vote for more than one-fifth of the shares represented at the meeting, unless 
otherwise stipulated in the articles of association 
Swedish Government SOU 1995:44 p. 20
Companies Act 2005 All directors are to act in the interest of all shareholders The General Clause in the Swedish Companies act 8 
Ch. 41 § (ABL 2005:551)
Co-determination Two unionrepresentatives from blue and white color unions Medbestämmandelagen MBL 1974:580
DEVELOPMENT OF SOFT LAW
The Swedish external NC Swedish Shareholders Association suggested a Governance Code 1993, with an NC Sweden introduced a CGC 2005
Shareholders can decide on the NC at the AGM or set up a procedure, usually no later than 6 month before the AGM. The CGC offers different alternatives (CGC Rule 2:2) 
Smaller shareholders can invite a participant The AGM structure was suggested by the Swedish Shareholders' association in 1993. 
To provide continuity a member can be asked to stay, even of stocks have been sold 4/5 of the companies apply the Q3 model
Member on NC For long the word "representative" has been used, which the CGC corrected in 2008, instead writing "appointed by", CGC 2008 2 § 1 but "representative is still used, 
partly as a result of th epresence of large owners.
Setup off external NC Usually the largest 3 or 4 shareholders are invited at the time of the Q3
A majority of its members must be independent of the company
At least one member must be independent of the company's largest shareholder or groups of shareholders acting in concert
Chair of the board cannot be the chair of the NC, no executives on the NC, CGC Rule 2:3
Directors can participate but only one may be dependent on a major owner
A representative of smaller shareholders can be invited to participate
To provide continuity a member can be asked to stay, even of stocks have been sold down
Shareholders can decide on the NC at the AGM or set up a procedure, usually no later than 6 month before the AGM. 4/5 of the companies apply the Q3 model
ROLE OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
Listing requirements 2005–2010 the Nasdaq Stockhlm listing requriement of two from large owners independent directors: Two independent in the 
Code 
All listed companies need to follow the code, including comply or explain
Swedish CGC The majority of the members of the board must be independent of the company
At least 2 directors must also be independent of majority owner (defined as owner with  +10 % of shares and votes)
Swedish Shareholders 
Association 
Wants to se 3 directors independent of large owners written in the Nasdaq Stockholm listing rules Suggested in the Owner Policy 2017
ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
Stewardship Code Sweden lacks a Stewardship Code. Many have compiled their own code. Swedish Investment Fund Assoication has a code
Limits on voting The national pensionfunds (SNPF) have a voting cap at 10%. The retail funds have limits, generally viewed to be 10 % too Regulated in law
Cont. Appendix A 
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